RESPONSE

IS TEXTUALISM DOOMED?

ILYA SOMIN

†

In response to Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 117 (2009).
In a provocative recent article, Jonathan Siegel argues that textualism is ultimately doomed to irrelevance because its “inexorable radica1
lization . . . will cause it to lose the interpretation wars.” Siegel contends that textualism’s commitment to the “axiom” that “the statutory
text is the law” renders it blind to all competing considerations, thereby forcing textualist judges to enforce “absurd” interpretations of
2
statutes and ones based on “scrivener’s errors.” Over time, textualism
will “work itself pure,” eliminating any constraints on its inherent log3
ic. This in turn is likely to make the results of textualism so unattractive that it will lose out to rival approaches such as purposivism and in4
tentionalism.
Siegel has made a compelling argument and identified some possible genuine weaknesses of textualism. I believe he is correct to conclude that textualism is unlikely to win a decisive victory in the
longstanding debate over interpretation. But both his normative critique of textualism and his positive prediction about textualism’s future are overdrawn.
In Part I of this Response, I take issue with elements of Siegel’s
normative analysis. I argue that textualism’s adherence to text is
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compatible with eliminating scrivener’s errors. On the other hand, it
may not be compatible with allowing judges to strike down what they
consider to be “absurd” interpretations of statutes that are dictated by
the text. This, however, may be a strength of textualism rather than a
weakness in a society with deep ideological disagreements over what
counts as “absurd.”
Part II argues that Siegel understates the importance of textual
ambiguity. Where the text is ambiguous, resort to extrinsic evidence
of meaning is compatible with textualist premises and may sometimes
even be required by them. The purpose of a statute and its legislative
history may shed light on the meaning of ambiguous language by revealing the context in which it was enacted. So long as this type of
evidence is used to interpret the meaning of an ambiguous text rather
than override the meaning of a clear one, textualists need not categorically reject it.
Part III takes up the question of textualism’s future. Even if Siegel
is correct about the radicalizing logic of textualism, textualist judges
may not follow it to its limits. Unlike legal scholars, judges are chosen
by a political process that does not emphasize adherence to broad
theories of interpretation. Few judges feel a strong imperative to push
logical consistency to its limits. They may well be content to make use
of textualist methodology without acting on all the logical implications of doing so.
Given the intuitive appeal of textualism and the weaknesses of its
rivals, textualism might well remain influential even if it is flawed for
the reasons Siegel suggests. On the other hand, it is unlikely to completely vanquish the opposition. The same pragmatic mindset that
leads judges to embrace a relatively moderate version of textualism is
likely to prevent judges from rejecting alternative methodologies
completely. Ultimately, most judges place less value on methodological consistency than academics do. For that reason, we may have to
wait a long time for “the interpretation wars” to reach any definitive
resolution.
I. HOW RADICAL IS TEXTUALISM?
Siegel’s key argument is that the textualist principle that “[t]he
5
text is the law” precludes recognition of any competing considera5
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tions. He takes issue with recent attempts by Jonathan Molot, Caleb
7
8
Nelson, and John Manning to reconcile textualism with elements of
9
other interpretive methodologies. Siegel contends that if the text really is the law, then no other considerations can be allowed to override
it. Thus, he believes that textualists are required to enforce the text
even if doing so leads to absurd results or to the perpetuation of “scri10
vener’s errors.” Textualists must enforce even “[f]lat-out statutory
11
errors” if they remain true to their methodology.
In reality, textualism need not be as rigid as Siegel suggests.
There is no inconsistency between adherence to text and correcting
scrivener’s errors.
Textualists are indeed committed to the proposition that the text
is the law. But which text? The text that is “the law” is that which has
been duly enacted in accordance with the procedures outlined in the
Constitution, which require it to be voted on by a majority of both
12
houses of Congress and then presented to the president. As prominent textualist Judge Frank Easterbrook put it, textualism rests “on
the constitutional allocation of powers. The political branches adopt
13
texts through prescribed procedures; what ensues is the law.” That is
14
the root of what Siegel calls the “textualists’ formalist axiom.”
But if the text in the United States Code contains a clerical error
that makes it different from the one that members of Congress
thought they had before them when they voted, it is not in fact the
same text that was enacted in accordance with constitutionally mandated procedures. In such a case, the text would not actually be “the
law” for precisely the formalist reasons that Siegel claims ultimately
require textualists to enforce scrivener’s errors.
6
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To be sure, an error in transcription of this sort must be distinguished from a situation where there is no question that the text in
the United States Code is the same as that which Congress voted on,
but the legislators simply overlooked the ways in which that text might
15
defeat their purposes. In some instances, it may be difficult to tell
the difference between a scrivener’s error and legislation that is poorly drafted. Textualists as well as nontextualists may disagree among
themselves as to whether a scrivener’s error has actually occurred.
Where one clearly has happened, however, judicial repudiation of the
error does not conflict with textualism’s formalist axiom. Indeed,
such correction may even be required by it. After all, adhering to a
text created by a clerical error means imposing a “law” that has not actually been enacted by the processes required by the Constitution.
Siegel is on firmer ground in arguing that textualism requires
16
judges to uphold statutes that lead to seemingly “absurd” results.
Even if a duly enacted statutory text leads to such outcomes, it has still
passed through the procedural requirements mandated by the Constitution and is therefore still law as textualists define it. Where Siegel
errs is in assuming that this result is intolerable. While it may sometimes lead to the enforcement of flawed policies, it is not clear that
judicial efforts to root out absurdity will on balance prevent more
harm than they cause.
In practice, the absurdity doctrine leads judges to root out statutory language that seems absurd to them. As Lord Bramwell famously
put it, “what seems absurd to one man does not seem absurd to
17
another.” In an ideologically diverse society such as our own, what
seems absurd to conservatives may not seem so to liberals or libertarians, and vice versa. Judges’ interpretations of “absurdity” will inevitably be influenced by their own ideological predispositions.
Some laws that seem absurd to judges because of their ideological
perspectives may actually be beneficial. There is no reason to expect
that allowing judges to eliminate what they perceive to be absurd laws
will remove more harmful statutory texts than good ones. My point is

15
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not that eliminating such “absurdities” is necessarily harmful. I merely wish to question Siegel’s assumption that failure to do so will lead to
terrible results, so much so that it discredits textualism.
To be sure, one could try to limit the ideological bias that infects
the absurdity doctrine by confining it to cases where “all mankind
18
would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application.” But
such cases are likely to be extremely rare in an ideologically diverse
19
society. That which seems absurd to conservatives may often seem
desirable to liberals for precisely the reasons that the former believe it
to be absurd. In the rare instances where a statutory text really does
meet with such universal disapprobation, the legislature might well
correct the error itself, especially if that error has any substantial effect
on important policies.
II. STATUTORY AMBIGUITY AND METHODOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE
A key element of Siegel’s case against textualism is that it suppo20
sedly cannot assimilate any of the insights of rival theories. Because
textualism insists that only the text can be the law, he argues that it is
necessarily blind to the possible utility of purpose-based statutory
analysis, legislative history, and other alternative tools.
Siegel may be correct with respect to cases where the statutory text
is clear. In such situations, textualists cannot consistently permit the
text to be trumped by other considerations. In situations where the
text is ambiguous, however, textualists can use other methodologies to
interpret it without sacrificing their fundamental axiom. Siegel himself concedes that “[g]ood textualists do not insist that text must be
interpreted literally and without consideration of context. . . . Rather,
textualists recognize that where a statutory term has multiple meanings, context should inform an interpreter’s understanding of which
21
meaning applies.” As Siegel notes, textualist judges and legal scholars such as Justice Scalia and Professor John Manning have also rec22
ognized the relevance of context.

18
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He insists, however, that “[c]onsideration of purpose is differ23
ent.” Textualists, he contends, cannot give it any weight without sacrificing the axiom that the text is the law.
It is difficult to see why textualists can consider the “context” of an
ambiguous statute but not its intended purpose. After all, the purpose intended by the statute’s drafters is itself a part of the context in
which the text was enacted. Textualists argue that an ambiguous text
should be interpreted in accordance with the meaning understood at
the time of enactment. For example, Justice Scalia contends that
judges’ “job begins with a text that Congress has passed and the President has signed,” and they must “read the words of that text as an or24
dinary Member of Congress would have read them.” Presumably,
the ordinary member’s reading would at least to some extent be influenced by the purpose for which the statute was enacted. For that reason, statutory purpose may be a part of the historical context that textualists may refer to in interpreting an ambiguous statute.
Siegel cites several textualist judges for the proposition that tex25
tualists “look on consideration of statutory purpose with suspicion.”
However, these judges’ suspicions seem to be focused on cases where
consideration of purpose is disconnected from the text. Thus, Justice
Scalia condemns courts that consider “purpose, independent of the lan26
guage in a statute,” and Judge Easterbrook denounces the “[t]he invocation of disembodied purposes, reasons cut loose from the language” of the
27
text. These statements are perfectly consistent with using evidence
of purpose to illuminate the meaning of an ambiguous statute. There
is a distinction between using intent in a way that overrides or ignores the
statutory text and using it to shed light on the meaning of unclear text.
The same consideration can even be used to provide a textualist
justification for using legislative history when interpreting vague text.
After all, legislative history could potentially provide evidence of the
historical context of the text and how it was interpreted at the time of
enactment. It can do so in much the same way as evidence of language usage from contemporary dictionaries and other sources that

23
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28

textualists do not object to using. Contra Justice Scalia, textualists
29
need not “object to the use of legislative history on principle.” Even
as strong a textualist as Judge Easterbrook has recognized this, noting
that “judges may learn from the legislative history even when the text
is ‘clear.’ Clarity depends on context, which legislative history may il30
luminate.”
Textualists cannot allow purpose or legislative history to trump
the text. But they can use either or both to illuminate the meaning of
an otherwise unclear statute by shedding light on the historical context in which it was enacted.
As both Siegel and the textualists agree, such uses of purpose and
legislative history sometimes mislead more than they help. For example, legislative history may reflect only the views of a few unrepresentative
legislators and staffers and purpose-based analysis may sometimes
31
attribute a unitary purpose to a fractious legislature where none exists.
It is possible that these dangers of considering purpose and legislative history outweigh the possible benefits. For present purposes, I
take no position on this longstanding debate. However, textualism
does not categorically rule out the use of these tools merely because it
insists that only the statutory text can be law. Rather, that textualist
axiom leaves open the possibility that legislative history and purpose
might shed light on the context in which an ambiguous statute was
enacted. Whether the costs of pursuing that possibility outweigh the
benefits is a different question.
III. WHY TEXTUALISM WILL NOT “WORK ITSELF PURE”
Even if I am wrong to argue that the logic of textualism is less radical than Siegel supposes, textualism is unlikely to fade away as he
predicts. He claims that “it is difficult to sustain a contradiction within
judge-made doctrine indefinitely” because “[i]f a judicial doctrine
contains an illogical contradiction, judges and scholars will point it out,
and the force of their criticism will create pressure to reform the doc32
33
trine.” For this reason, “judge-made law works itself pure over time.”
28

See, for example MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 224-29 (1994),
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Siegel therefore predicts that textualism is likely to become more and
more radical over time because of the supposed logical incompatibility
34
between textualism and other methodologies of interpretation.
I do not deny that such “pressure” for consistency exists. But it is
weaker than Siegel supposes. As Richard Posner has recently empha35
sized, “Judges [a]re [n]ot [l]aw [p]rofessors.” They are nominated
and confirmed through a political process that emphasizes ideology,
connections to politicians, and general professional competence, not
methodological consistency of the sort valued by academic theorists.
Most judges have at best a limited interest in issues of legal theory. They
36
have what Posner calls a “pragmatic” orientation. Thus, they are less
likely to be bothered by occasional inconsistencies than are scholars.
Siegel himself notes that “[e]ven stalwart textualists such as Justice
Scalia permit . . . exceptions to the textualist dogma that enacted text
37
simply is the law.” If even the most committed textualists in the judiciary have not allowed their methodology to “work itself pure” as Siegel expects, it is likely that less dedicated textualists (and those less interested in legal theory than a former academic such as Scalia) will
continue to tolerate even greater impurities.
To be sure, Siegel predicts that such contradictions will be eliminated over time and cites a few cases that he believes are indicative of
38
this process. But in a judiciary that produces thousands of opinions
each year, it is possible to find a few examples of almost any use of jurisprudential methods. If textualism is indeed “working itself pure”
after decades of tolerating what Siegel regards as internal contradictions, we need more evidence than this to prove it.
In noting the pragmatic, atheoretical orientation of most judges, I
do not mean to praise it. To the contrary, I believe that judicial
39
pragmatism has important shortcomings. But whether defensible or

34

See id. at 148.
RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 204 (2008).
36
Id. at 207.
37
Siegel, supra note 1, at 146.
38
Id. at 138-44, 157-67 (citing Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550
U.S. 81 (2007); Limtiaco v. Camacho, 549 U.S. 483 (2007);; Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1309 v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 435 F.3d 1140, 1146 (9th Cir. 2006), reh’g
denied, 448 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2006)).
39
See Ilya Somin, Richard Posner’s Democratic Pragmatism, 16 CRITICAL REV. 1 (2004)
(reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003)). The
published title of this article was Richard Posner’s Democratic Pragmatism and the Problem of
Ignorance. However, the last five words were mistakenly added by the editors of Critical
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not, the prevalence of pragmatism reduces the likelihood that textualism will “work itself pure” as Siegel predicts.
A further reason why textualism is likely to persist is its intuitive
appeal. Textualism comports with many lay understandings of law as
a system of rules laid down in an authoritative text that all citizens can
access to determine whether a proposed course of action is legal. This
intuition has its flaws. But it is nonetheless widely held, including by
many lawyers and judges. Its intuitive appeal helps ensure that textualism will continue to influence judicial decisions.
CONCLUSION
Despite Professor Siegel’s cogent analysis, I remain skeptical that
textualism has an “inexorable logic” as radical as he claims. It can
consistently incorporate more insights from other methodologies than
he gives it credit for. Even if the logic of textualism is as radical as he describes, it does not necessarily follow that it will “work itself pure” in a judiciary filled with judges who have far less interest in grand theories of
interpretation and methodological consistency than academics do.
None of this proves that textualism is the best possible theory of
interpretation or that it will ever “win” the interpretive wars. To the
contrary, I doubt that any clear winner will emerge anytime soon. In
an ideologically diverse judiciary and legal profession, it is unlikely
that any one theory will command a clear consensus. Textualism may
never definitively triumph over its rivals. But it is nonetheless here to
stay as a major player in the debate.

Preferred Citation: Ilya Somin, Response, Is Textualism Doomed?,
158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 235 (2010),
http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/04-2010/Somin.pdf.

